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Introduction
Prior to 2005, debtors in financial distress could file for bankruptcy and have their credit card debts and other unsecured debts discharged. This made it easier for financially distressed homeowners to avoid defaulting on their mortgages, since the money that they saved on paying credit card bills could be used to make their mortgage payments. The availability of debt relief in bankruptcy was widely known, the costs of filing were low, and there was little stigma attached to filing for bankruptcy. Even highincome debtors could take advantage of bankruptcy. But the 2005 bankruptcy reform changed this situation by raising the cost of filing and by making some higher-income and higher-asset debtors ineligible. Did bankruptcy reform therefore contribute to the foreclosure crisis by closing off a procedure that previously helped distressed homeowners save their homes?
In this paper, we examine the connection between bankruptcy reform and mortgage default. We use a large dataset of mortgages originated in [2004] [2005] to examine whether the 2005 bankruptcy reform caused default rates on mortgages to rise and whether the rise in default rates was more than temporary. Our main result is that bankruptcy reform caused default rates for both prime and subprime mortgages to rise during the period before the beginning of the mortgage crisis. We also find that default rates rose in response to two specific provisions of bankruptcy reform that made filing for bankruptcy less attractive: the $125,000 cap on the homestead exemption and the new means test in bankruptcy. Bernstein (2008) and Morgan, Iverson and Botsch (2008) were the first to suggest that bankruptcy reform caused mortgage rates to rise by shifting risk from unsecured lenders to mortgage lenders. Bernstein's paper does not contain any empirical tests.
Morgan et al argued that bankruptcy reform caused mortgage default rates to rise by more in states with high homestead exemption levels, because debtors previously gained the most from filing for bankruptcy in these states. They tested this relationship by examining whether default rates rose by more in states with higher exemption levels. But bankruptcy reform did not in fact change the treatment of homestead exemption levels in bankruptcy, except by imposing a cap on the exemption for a small proportion of homeowners. Also because Morgan et al used aggregate state-year data covering a long time period, they were unable to distinguish between the effects on default rates of bankruptcy reform versus the mortgage crisis. We therefore re-examine the relationship between bankruptcy reform and mortgage default, using more detailed data.
The paper proceeds as follows. We start by briefly describing U.S. bankruptcy law and how the 2005 bankruptcy reform affected homeowners' incentives to default on their mortgages. We then describe our dataset, our empirical specification, and the results.
U.S. Bankruptcy Law and the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform
US bankruptcy law provides two separate personal bankruptcy procedures-Chapter 7 and Chapter 13-and both help financially distressed homeowners keep their homes.
Prior to 2005, debtors were allowed to choose between them. Under Chapter 7, debtors' unsecured debts are discharged. They are obliged to use only their assets above an asset exemption level to repay; future earnings are entirely exempt. States set the asset exemption levels and have different exemptions for different types of assets. But in nearly all the states, the homestead exemption for equity in an owner-occupied home is the largest. Under Chapter 13, debtors are obliged to have regular earnings and they must follow a court-supervised repayment plan that devotes part of their earnings to repaying unsecured debt over a period of 3 to 5 years. They may also be obliged to use some of their assets to repay unsecured debt.
Homeowners in financial distress benefit indirectly from filing under Chapter 7, because reductions in their unsecured debt payments increase their ability to pay their mortgages. They are allowed to keep their homes in bankruptcy as long as their home equity is less than the state's homestead exemption. But Chapter 7 provides little help to homeowners who have already defaulted on their mortgage payments, because it does not stop lenders from foreclosing more than temporarily. Also, mortgage payments on a debtor's principle residence cannot be lowered in Chapter 7.
Homeowners in financial distress benefit more directly from filing under Chapter 13, since a Chapter 13 filing stops lenders from foreclosing during the repayment plan, as long as homeowners are making payments on the plan. Homeowners who file under Chapter 13 must repay their mortgage arrears in full, plus interest, as part of their repayment plans. If they succeed in repaying the arrears and also make all of their normal mortgage payments, then the original mortgage contract is reinstated. Prior to 2005, debtors proposed their own Chapter 13 plans and were allowed to choose the length of the repayment period and the amount they repaid unsecured creditors, subject to the approval of the bankruptcy judge. Most bankruptcy judges allowed debtors to propose plans that repaid mortgage arrears in full but repaid only a token amount-10% or less--to unsecured creditors. Filing under Chapter 13 also benefits homeowners because they can challenge fees and penalties that mortgage lenders have added to the mortgage and because they can have second mortgages converted from secured to unsecured debts if the first mortgage exceeds the value of the home.
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As an example, suppose homeowner A has mortgage payments of $1,500 per month and owes arrears of $10,000, including past due payments, penalties, and late fees. She also has $30,000 in unsecured debt. Suppose the debtor's home equity and other assets are entirely exempt. In Chapter 7, the unsecured debt is discharged, but the debtor must repay the mortgage arrears in full or else the lender can foreclose. But in Chapter 13, the debtor can spread repayment of the mortgage arrears, plus interest, over three to five years. If the interest rate is 6% and the plan period is five years, then the debtor repays $193.00 per month. In addition, she must also make her normal mortgage payments of $1,500 per month during the plan period. The debtor is not required to repay more than a token amount to unsecured creditors.
But bankruptcy law provides less help to homeowners if their home equity exceeds the homestead exemption. Suppose homeowner B's home is worth $260,000, her mortgage is $200,000, her mortgage arrears are $10,000, her unsecured debt is $70,000, and her state's homestead exemption is $40,000. If homeowner B files under Chapter 7, she is obliged to sell her home because her home equity exceeds the homestead exemption. After the mortgage and the mortgage arrears are repaid, she receives the homestead exemption of $40,000 and the remaining $10,000 goes to unsecured creditors.
If she instead files under Chapter 13, she can keep her home, but she must repay the arrears in full plus interest, make her normal mortgage payments, and pay $10,000 to unsecured creditors as part of her repayment plan. who have non-exempt income in excess of their non-exempt home equity is predicted to rise as a result of bankruptcy reform, since they also gain less from filing.
In the next section, we use a micro-level panel dataset of mortgages that follows the evolution of loan payments over time to test these predictions. We follow them until they are repaid in full, go into default, or until the end of the sample period. We define default to occur when mortgage payments are six months or more delinquent and we drop mortgages from the dataset after the default date. In order to (2007) for discussion. 11 The HMDA data covers all mortgage applications and originations. Mortgages were matched based on the zipcode of the property, the date when the mortgage originated (within 5 days), the origination amount (within $500), purpose of the loan (purchase, refinance or other), the type of loan (conventional, VA guaranteed, FHA guaranteed or other), occupancy type (owner occupied or non-owner occupied), and lien status (first lien or other). The match rate was 48%. We calculated summary statistics of all the variables that are included in this study and find no statistical differences between the mean of the variables. In other words, the matched sample is a random sample of the original LPS sample. Results Table 1 gives the results of a difference-in-difference analysis that tests each of the variables just discussed, using the raw data. The top panel is for prime mortgages and the bottom panel for subprime mortgages. For both samples, the mortgage default rate following bankruptcy reform-the increase is around .03 percentage points, or 15%, for prime mortgages and .11 percentage points, or 8%, for subprime mortgages. The difference-in-difference for the homestead exemption cap is positive and large for both samples, suggesting that the adoption of the cap caused default rates to rise substantially for affected homeowners. But the two difference-in-differences variables for the means test, MT1 and MT2, are small and sometimes have the wrong sign.
Data and summary statistics

Specification and Data Description
Turn now to the regressions, where we examine how these results change if we introduce control variables. In all regressions, the control variables are whether the debtor is married, is African-American, or is female, a series of dummy variables for the homeowner's FICO score, 16 the homeowner's debt-to-income ratio (including other debt), whether the property is single-family, whether the loan is a jumbo, whether the loan is for purchase rather than re-finance, whether the loan has a fixed or adjustable interest rate, and whether full documentation of income and assets was provided at origination. We also include dummy variables for whether the state allows deficiency judgments, whether the state allows non-judicial foreclosures, and whether the state exempts more than 75 percent of wages from wage garnishment. 17 All of these variables remain constant over time. Variables that change each month include the loan-to-value ratio, whether the loan was part of a private securitization, and whether the loan was kept in the lender's portfolio (the omitted category is loans that were securitized by one of the U.S. government agencies), the age of the loan in months, age squared, a measure of the debtor's benefit from refinancing (which depends on the current interest rate relative to the mortgage interest rate), 18 the lagged income growth rate in the area, the lagged unemployment rate in the area, and the lagged cumulative default rate in the debtor's zipcode. 16 We put FICO scores into four bins, [450, 550] , [550, 650] , [650, 750] , and [750, 850] . The omitted category is . 17 States that allow deficiency judgments allow lenders after foreclosure to sue the mortgage-holder for the difference between amount of the mortgage and the sale price of the house. States that allow non-judicial foreclosure permit lenders to foreclose without obtaining a court order. Federal law protects 75% of wages from garnishment, but some states protect more than 75% of wages. 18 Following the literature, we use the Principal/Value as a measure of the incentive to refinance (Richard and Roll, 1989) . The Principal/Value (PV t ) measures the ratio of the present value of the payments on mortgage principal outstanding at time t using the existing mortgage rate to that using the current rate available on refinance:
, where r t and r 0 are the current and existing rates on the mortgage, and M is the maturity in number of months. We use the 5-year constant maturity Treasury rate as the current rate on the mortgage. regressions use ordinary least squares, but we also report the results using a Cox proportional hazard model below.
Column (1) shows the results when we enter only the bankruptcy reform dummy and controls. This regression tests our hypothesis that bankruptcy reform increased the mortgage default rate by making it more expensive for all homeowners to use bankruptcy to save their homes. The bankruptcy reform dummy is positive and strongly statistically significant (p < .0001) in both samples. The model implies that the prime mortgage default rate rose by .08/.22 = 36% and the subprime mortgage default rate rose by .16/1.35 = 12% when bankruptcy reform went into effect.
Columns (2) - (4) homeowners in these states previously gained the most from filing for bankruptcy. They found that the coefficient of t B *(homestead exemption) was positive and statistically significant for prime mortgages, but not for subprime mortgages, while t B *(unlimited homestead exemption dummy) was never statistically significant.
However we argued that this interpretation of the new bankruptcy law overstates the role of the homestead exemption, since the reform did not change the treatment of homestead exemptions in bankruptcy except for homeowners who are affected by the cap on the homestead exemption (captured by our it HC variable) and homeowners whose non-exempt income exceeds their non-exempt home equity (captured by our it MT 2 variable). Another problem with the Morgan et al approach is that they claim to be estimating difference-in-differences, but their interaction terms cannot be interpreted as difference-in-differences unless t B and the homestead exemption variables are also entered separately. Table 4 shows the results when we run Morgan et al's specification, using our dataset and our control variables. Columns (3) and (4) give the results when we add the additional variables necessary to interpret their results as difference-in-differences. Here the interaction of t B and the homestead exemption is either insignificant or has the wrong sign in both samples, but the interaction of t B and the unlimited homestead exemption dummy is positive and significant in both samples. These results presumably occur because the unlimited homestead exemption variable in their model is capturing the combined effect of the t it B HC * and t it B MT * 2 interactions in our model. They suggest that bankruptcy reform was associated with a 36% rise in prime mortgage defaults by homeowners in states with unlimited homestead exemption states and a 51% rise in subprime mortgage defaults by homeowners in these states-similar to our results 19 Morgan et al (2009) standardize the homestead exemption using the median housing value in the state. We standardized the state homestead exemption level using the appraised value of the house.
for the homestead exemption cap. Overall, our result using Morgan et al's specification confirm that the 2005 bankruptcy reform increased mortgage default rates.
In order to determine whether the effect of bankruptcy reform on default was temporary, we also reran our estimations using a period of one year before to one year But surprisingly, the coefficient of the bankruptcy reform dummy itself becomes larger in the prime mortgage sample-the rise in the default rate is 50% over the longer period, compared to 36% in the shorter period. For subprime mortgages, the rise in the default rate is 7% over the longer period, compared to 11% over the shorter period. These results suggest that bankruptcy reform caused default rates to rise more than just temporarily.
As another robustness check, we re-ran our estimations using a Cox proportional hazard model and the results are shown in Tables 6-8. The direction of the effects and the pattern of statistical significance are the same as the OLS results.
Conclusion
Our main result is that the 2005 bankruptcy reform caused mortgage default rates to rise and the increase was more than just temporary. Comparing three months before versus after bankruptcy reform, prime mortgage default rates rose by 36% and subprime mortgage default rates by 11%. Comparing one year before versus after bankruptcy reform, prime mortgage default rates rose by 50% and subprime mortgage default rates by 7%. Second, default rates of homeowners subject to the cap on the homestead exemption rose by even more-the increase during the three-month period was 45% for prime mortgage-holders and 54% for subprime mortgage-holders. The means test, in contrast, had little effect on default rates. We also found support for Morgan et al's (2009) Table 3 and are entered in all regressions. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Notes: All regressions include the same control variables as in Table 3 . *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
